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INTELLIGENT DESIGN, 
IRREDUCIBLE COMPLEXITY, AND MINDS— 
A REPLY TO JOHN BEAUDOIN
Elliott Sober
In my paper "Intelligent Design Theory and the Supernatural—the 'God or 
Extra-Terrestrial' Reply," I argued that Intelligent Design (ID) Theory, when 
coupled with independently plausible further assumptions, leads to the con­
clusion that a supernatural intelligent designer exists. ID theory is therefore 
not neutral on the question of whether there are supernatural agents. In this 
respect, it differs from the Darwinian theory of evolution. John Beaudoin 
replies to my paper in his "Sober on Intelligent Design Theory and the Intel­
ligent Designer," arguing that my paper faces two challenges. In the present 
paper, I try to address Beaudoin's challenges.
John Beaudoin1 offers two objections to my argument2 that Intelligent 
Design (ID) theory is not neutral on the question of whether there are 
supernatural designers. The first concerns my claim that the central thesis 
of ID theory is that
(1) If a system found in nature is irreducibly complex, then it was 
caused to exist by an intelligent designer.
The second concerns my assertion that
(2) Some of the minds found in nature are irreducibly complex.
Beaudoin doubts that (1) is ID theory's central thesis; with respect to (2), he 
points out that Michael Behe3 "seems not to grant, at least not explicitly" 
that the concept of irreducible complexity applies to minds. Beaudoin's 
point, I take it, is that only physical systems can be irreducibly complex.
Beaudoin offers three reasons for thinking that "Behe does not mean to 
include minds" when he discusses irreducible complexity:
(i) Behe doesn't cite minds as examples of irreducibly complex systems.
(ii) Behe requires that the parts of an irreducibly complex system must 
be "well matched," and Beaudoin contends that the relation of 
well-matching is spatial.
(iii) Behe says that irreducible complexity is a sign of ID when it is 
found in physical systems that have physically interacting parts.
Points (i) and (iii) do not touch my claim that (2) is true and that ID theo­
rists are obliged to grant this. Whether Behe intended for his definition of
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irreducible complexity to have the consequence that minds can be irreduc- 
ibly complex is not germane. With respect to (iii), Behe's claiming that ir­
reducible complexity in a physical system suffices to establish the existence 
of an intelligent designer does not show that he thinks that the system's 
being physical is necessary for the concept of irreducible complexity to ap­
ply. As for (ii), I don't agree that "being well matched" is a spatial relation. 
Two thoughts in a theory can be well-matched in the sense of being well- 
suited to each other. The same goes for two people in love.
Beaudoin offers one more piece of evidence concerning what Behe 
intended. After making point (iii), he says that "where the parts of the 
system do not physically interact, Behe states [that] the intervention of 
intelligence must be detected 'in other ways,'" and here Beaudoin refers to 
a footnote in Darwin's Black Box in which Behe discusses "patterns of coin 
flips or other systems that do not physically interact."4 This is the stron­
gest textual evidence that Beaudoin presents, but the fact remains that 
Behe defined irreducible complexity without requiring that the system be 
physical. He says that an irreducibly complex system is "a single system 
composed of several well-matched interacting parts that contribute to the 
basic function, wherein the removal of any one of the parts causes the 
system to effectively cease functioning."5
Beaudoin considers whether it would arbitrary for the ID theorist to 
restrict proposition (1) to physical systems. He says that it might not be if 
we know less about the mind than we do about biochemistry. There are 
two questions here. Do we know enough about a mind to tell whether it 
is irreducibly complex? On the assumption that something is irreducibly 
complex, are we entitled to conclude from this that it was produced by 
an intelligent designer? I think it is clear enough that a mind found in 
nature that is capable of planning and fashioning an irreducibly complex 
system must itself be irreducibly complex. If ID theorists grant this, but 
then doubt whether we can conclude that this irreducibly complex mind 
was intelligently designed, then I am puzzled why they would be entitled 
to take the supposition that the bacterial flagellum is irreducibly complex 
to show that it was intelligently designed.
In none of his three replies does Beaudoin address the positive argu­
ment I gave for thinking that (2) is true. A mind that designs and builds 
an irreducibly complex system (that's the relevant way in which a de­
signer would bring an irreducibly complex structure into existence) has 
a function and the designer's mind couldn't perform that function if any 
of its interacting parts were excised. Consider, for example, the mind of 
a watchmaker as he designs and builds a watch. He has a set of beliefs 
and desires from which he formulates a plan; then he executes the plan 
by initiating actions, using his perceptual faculties to monitor how the 
project is going and perhaps modifying his plan along the way. The func­
tion (or, at least, a function) of the watchmaker's mind is to allow him to 
deal effectively with his environment; if you remove the watchmaker's 
beliefs, or desires, or intentions, or perceptual states, or memories, his 
mind will be unable to do this. Beaudoin raises the interesting question 
of how (2) is related to various positions on the mind/body problem. I 
am inclined to think that dualists and physicalists should both grant that 
(2) is true.
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There is room to wonder whether other function claims about the 
watchmaker's mind might also be true. In addition, one might wonder 
exactly how the watchmaker's process of planning and building should be 
segmented into parts. However, if either of these questions is thought to 
undermine my assessment of the watchmaker's mind, why don't the same 
questions undermine Behe's assessment of the bacterial flagellum? This is 
the point I tried to make in my discussion of the wine bottle problem.6
Given his assessment of proposition (2), Beaudoin proposes that propo­
sition (1) be restricted, the result being the thesis that
(1*) If a physical system found in nature is irreducibly complex, then it 
was caused to exist by an intelligent designer.
Beaudoin's other challenge to my argument is his claim that even (1*) isn't 
the central thesis of ID theory. Rather, he thinks that (1*) "plays a central 
role in a justification for intelligent design theory that most design theo­
rists use." In his view, "design theorists advance multiple arguments for 
their view, some of which don't use (1*), or they do not make an argument 
with (1*) carrying all or most of the evidential burden." For Beaudoin, the 
trouble with (1*) is that irreducible complexity plays a merely epistemo­
logical role in the ID framework7 and constitutes just one line of evidence 
among several for intelligent design.
If (1*) isn't the central ID thesis, what is? Beaudoin thinks the central the­
sis is that some structures in nature (e.g., the bacterial flagellum) are prod­
ucts of ID. Let us divide this proposition in two—there is the claim that 
some structures in nature are produced by ID and the claim that the bacte­
rial flagellum is an example. The first of these is uncontroversial. No one 
doubts that watches and cars exist because of intelligent design. And even 
if we beef up this first conjunct and consider the claim that some biological 
structures are products of ID (I think this was Beaudoin's intent), the claim 
is still uncontroversial. It is not in dispute that plant and animal breeders 
have fashioned a variety of biological systems via artificial selection. Does 
this mean that the only thing that is nontrivial in ID theory is the second 
conjunct—the claim about the bacterial flagellum (and presumably other 
examples)? I don't read Paley8 or Behe in this way. True, each discusses a 
number of examples. But in each case, the examples are supposed to il­
lustrate a general principle; this is what (1*) helps codify. Paley and Behe 
would be within their rights to say that their main argument goes through 
even if the details of a few of their examples turn out to be off the mark.
I agree that there might be ID arguments that are not based on the 
concept of irreducible complexity; Beaudoin says that some ID theorists 
have developed arguments of this sort. However, this is not enough to 
undermine the argument I made in my paper. As long as (1) is part of 
the theory, the theory leads (once independently plausible assumptions 
are taken into account) to the conclusion that a supernatural intelligent 
designer exists. ID theorists who wish to avoid this consequence need to 
expunge (1) from their theory; supplementing it with other arguments for 
ID does no good. It doesn't matter whether (1) is central or peripheral or 
whether it is epistemological or substantive.
Beaudoin mentions that ID theory might be fragmented into a number 
of separate theories, each composed of a different argument but always
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for the same conclusion. The result that Beaudoin has in mind is that only 
some of the resulting theories will have supernatural consequences. It is 
noteworthy that Beaudoin does not himself view ID theory in this way; for 
him, the theory is a single proposition that might be supported by mul­
tiple arguments. Surely nothing much should depend on whether we say 
that there is one ID theory that has different arguments attached to it or 
that there are many ID theories. I therefore accept Beaudoin's suggestion 
that my argument applies, in the first instance, to versions of ID theory 
that use the concept of irreducible complexity. The question then needs to 
be considered of whether an Aquinas-style argument similar to the one I 
constructed applies to other versions as well.9
University of Wisconsin, Madison
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